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cedure for the revocation of license issued under it condemns it as
unconstitutional.34
The license required by the Opelika ordinance was revocable at
the unrestrained and unreviewable descretion of the licensing com-
mission without cause and without notice or an opportunity to be
heard. Generally a license may not be revoked without notice or
hearing if the occupation or activity serves some useful purpose and
if the pursuit of such activity affords but slight opportunity for the
infliction of substantial injury to the public health, safety, morals or
convenience. 3 5
Thus the Opelika ordinance denies the petitioner procedural due
process because the petitioner's activities did not injure or threaten
to injure public health, safety or morals.3 6 The freedom of religion
which the constitution purports to safeguard cannot be subjected to
uncontrolled administrative action. Indeed the Supreme Court of the
United States has previously held that a license to be issued at the
sole discretion of municipal officers is void,87 because it makes en-
joyment of the freedom of the press contingent upon the uncontrolled
will of administrative officers. Nevertheless, in the instant case the
unrestricted power to revoke licenses was sustained. To say that
the withholding, at will and without cause, of a license is an exercise
prohibited by the constitution but that the revocation of a privilege
without cause and opportunity to be heard is a valid exercise of power
is an anomaly to say the least.
TAXATION
MULTIPLE TAXATION OF INTANGIBLESI
Testator died domiciled in New York. At the time of his death
he owned stock of a Utah corporation represented by stock certificates
in his possession in New York. Utah imposed a tax on the transfer
by death. Administrators of the estate filed suit, claiming this was
a violation of due process. Held, there is no constitutional immunity
from multiple taxation. The state of incorporation has jurisdiction
to tax transfer by death of shares of stock owned by a non-resident.'The decisions of the present Supreme Court are based on the
34 Notice and opportunity to be heard are generally required for the
refusal to grant a license. Bratton v. Chandler, 260 U.S. 110
(1922). The tribunal must be impartial. Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U.S. 510 (1927). These requirements apply to administrative as
well as judicial proceedings. Lloyd v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329 (1922);
Note (1934) 34 COL. L. nEV. 332.
So Note (1926) 4 wIs. L. RSV. 180, 186. Likewise there must be citation
before hearing and hearing or opportunity of being heard beforejudgment if private rights are involved.
ss z parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 513 (U.S. 1873).
s7Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
1Utah State Tax Comm. v. Aldrich, 62 S. Ct. 1008, 86 L. Ed. 911
(1942).
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doctrine that the due process clause does not bar multiple taxation.2
The power to tax intangibles is not to be restricted to one state, and
the test of validity is the amount of protection and benefits con-
ferred on and the power over the persons whose relationships are the
source of the intangible rights.3 The view of the present majority
returns to a broader concept of "jurisdiction to tax."
The older cases were apparently decided on the theory that since
intangibles were "invisible" and easy to conceal, they would escape
taxation unless several states were given the opportunity to tax.4
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found even before the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment that there were certain limitations on the
powers of the states to tax.5 Later, in Union Refrigerator Transit Go.
v. Kentuckya the court indicated that, usually, only one state could
impose a tax on tangibles.7 Blackstone v. MillUer,8 decided two years
before, had permitted an inheritance tax on bank deposits to be im-
posed by both the state of physical situs and the state !of the owner's
domicle. It was not until thirty years later that the court found,
in a series of decisions, that the due process clause prohibited multiple
taxation.9 By using the fictional doctrine of mobilia sequuntur per-
sonam, intangibles were permitted to be taxed only by the state of
the domicile of the creditor of a chose in action or the owner of any
2 Utah State Tax Comm. v. Aldrich, 62 S. Ct. 1008, 86 L. Ed. 911 (1942) ;
Graves v. Elliott, 307 U.S. 383 (1939); Curry v. McCanless, 307
U.S. 357 (1939).
3 Utah State Tax Comm. v. Aldrich, 62 S. Ct. 1008, 1010, 86 L. Ed.
911, 914 (1942).
4 See Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 205(1905). This reason is of little consequence today as intangibles
are not so easy to conceal, and do not escape taxation so often
as to justify their being subject to the undue burden of multiple
taxation for this reason alone. Peppin, The Power of the States
to Tax Intangibles or Their Transfer (1930) 18 CALIF. L. REV.
638, 647.
fsTo allow every state where an object happened to be, regardless of
the character of its stay, to tax that object would be an unbearable
tax burden. Lowndes, Spurious Conceptions of the Constitutional
Law of Taxation (1934) 47 HARV. L. REV. 628, 637. At first the
Court found those limitations in the commerce clause, Hays v.
Pacific Mail S. S. Co., 17 How. 596 (U.S. 1854); then resort was
had to the contract clause, State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds,
15 Wall. 300 (U.S. 1872); and finally, about thirty five years
after its adoption, the due process clause was used to invalidate
a tax imposed without jurisdiction, Louisville & Jeffersonville
Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385 (1903).
6199 U.S. 194 (1905).
7Id. at 211.
8188 U.S. 189 (1903).
D Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1930)
(bonds); Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586 (1930) (bank de-
posits); Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 282 U.S. 1 (1930)
(choses in action); First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284
U.S. 312 (1932) (corporate stocks).
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other form of intangible.1o Two 1939 cases, Curry v. McCanless'1 and
Graves v. Elliott,1 2 presaged a return to the old idea that there was
no constitutional provision against multiple taxation, and to the broader
concept of jurisdiction to tax.'3 Now the Utah case has expressly
overruled First National Bank v. Maine'4 and returned intangibles to
the status they occupied before the Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. case.'5
In the instant case, the Court took the position that the state
of incorporation meets the "benefit, protection, and power" test and
therefore has jurisdiction to impose a death transfer tax.L6  The
policy of the majority in thus extending the taxing jurisdiction is
questionable and the minority has taken the more practical view.17
20 The use of the maxim was only the means to an end. The truth was
that the Court had come to feel that multiple taxation of intangible
property was just as objectionable from the economic standpoint
as if the property were tangible. Brown, Multiple Taxation by
the States-What Is Left of It (1935) 48 HARV. L. anv. 407, 408,
409. This was frankly admitted by Justice Sutherland in First
National Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312 (1932).
11307 U.S. 357 (1939).
12307 U.S. 383 (1939).
Is Both cases involved a revocable trust in a state other than the
domicile of the decedent. Both state of the trust and the state of
the domicile of the decedent were permitted to tax.
'-284 U.S. 312 (1932).
1' The instant case involved only corporate stock, but there is no
reason to believe that the rule will not be applied to other forms
of intangibles. See Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in Utah State
Tax Comm. v. Aldrich, 62 S. Ct. 1008, 1021. For a recent com-
prehensive treatment of taxation of intangibles see Brown, Present
Status of Multiple Taxation of Intangibles (1942) 40 MICH. L. REv.
806; of., Note (1940) 16 IND. L. j. 427 (sales tax).
16 The Court held: (1) the corporation owes its existence to Utah
and Utah law defines the nature and extent of the shareholder's
interest; (2) Utah law protects these rights; (3) Utah has
power over the transfer by the corporation of its shares of stock.
Utah State Tax Comm. v. Aldrich, 62 S. Ct. 1008, 1011. It is
generally admitted that "policy, not jurisdiction, is the nub of the
matter; intangible rights have no physical location from whichjurisdiction may be deduced." Pomerance, The Situs of Stock
(1931) 17 CORN. L. Q. 43, 59.
17 "Any conceivable 'opportunity,' 'protection,' or 'benefit' derived by
the Union Pacific stockholders from Utah is negligible in propor-
tion to the values Utah is authorized to tax." See Mr. Justice
Jackson, dissenting in Utah State Tax Comm. v. Aldrich, 62 S. Ct.
1008, 1015 (1942). The mere fact that Utah created the cor-
poration should not give it the right to tax the shares regardless
of their situs or the domicile of the owner. The Union Pacific
Ry. had been in existence eighteen years before Utah chartered
it. Less than nine per cent of the total track is laid in Utah,
and less than nine per cent of its income is derived in Utah. Its
western operating offices are in Nebraska. See Mr. Justice Jack-
son, dissenting in Utah State Tax Comm. v. Aldrich, 62 S. Ct.
1008, 1015 (1942). The extent of protection which Utah extends
to the stockholders is certainly slight. Although the majority
chose to practically disregard the fact, the Uniform Stock Trans-
fer Act, UTAH REv. STAT. ANN, (1933) §§ 18-3-1 ff., makes the stock
certificate the important element in the passing of title. The
transfer offices of the Union Pacific Ry. are located in New
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Nevertheless, the taxpayer is again confronted with the problem of
multiple taxation, an admitted evil,'s and the solution is clearly not
to come from the present Court unless there is a complete reversal of
policy, which is unlikely.19
Use of the compact clause of the Constitution has been suggested
as a solution,20 but the obvious effect would be to remove the ex-
clusive control from a single state.21 Several systems of regulation
by the federal government have been suggested, but these proposals
also meet serious difficulties. 22 Until some workable solution through
federal intervention can be found, the protection against multiple
taxation must come from the state legislatures.23 Several plans have
been tried by the states, 24 but the most satisfactory one yet used is
the system of interstate reciprocity.25  First tried by Massachusetts
York. Furthermore, the Utah death tax is on the right to trans-
mit. urAh REV. STAT. ANN. (1933) §§ 80-12-1 to 80-12-44; State
Tax Comm. v. Backman, 88 Utah 424, 55 P. (2d) 171 (1936).
It is to be noted that the "person" in the Court's test for validity
is the "person whose relationships are the origin of the rights,"
i.e. the corporation. Utah State Tax Comm. v. Aldrich, 62 S. Ct.
1008, 1010 (1942). As far as this tax is concerned, practically
the only benefit which the railroad received from Utah was the
corporate charter. This would hardly seem justification for the
imposition of the tax, even on the basis of the test established
by the majority. This is further indication that the decision is
based on policy.
18 Utah State Tax Comm. v. Aldrich, 62 S. Ct. 1008, 1012 (1942).
19 Ibid.
2 0 Frankfurter and Landis, Compact Clause of the Constitution (1925)
34 YALE L. T. 685, 704; see also Dutton, Compacts and Trade, Bar-
rier Controversies (1940) 16 IND. L 3. 204.
21 Brady, Statutory Solutions of Multiple Death Taxation (1927) 13
A. B. A. T. 147, 150.
22 A congressional bill providing that a certain percentage of revenue
accruing from federal estate and income taxes be segregated and
earmarked for distribution to those states which fall in line has
been proposed. Rode, A Primer on Interstate Taxation (1935) 44
YALE L. J. 165, 1181 to 1185. But any plan providing for federal
intervention must meet constitutional and administrative diffi-
culties; furthermore, it is difficult to.conceive of the states giving
up their tax powers. Seligman, Possible Methods of Removing
Inheritance Tax Difficulties (1925) 3 NAT. INCOME TAX MAO. 93.23 Even action by the state legislatures will not completely solve the
problem. Mutual adjustments would call for over 2000 separate
agreements. In the case of reciprocity acts, the greatest prob-
lem seems to be in uniform interpretation. For example, City
Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. New York Central R. Co., 253 N.Y.
49, 170 N. E. 489 (1930).
24 The "Wisconsin Plan" calls for apportionment for tax purposes of
the intangibles among the states wher e tangible property
representated is located; but here the valuation is almost impos-
sible. Legis. (1928) 28 COL. L. Rsv. 806, 808. The "Mathews FlatRate Plan," provides for taxation at uniform rates, without ex-
enmption, on the actual market value of the property transferred
by a non-resident to his executor. New York tried this plan andfound it expensive and beset with adminlstrative difficulties.
2 e individual statutes vary, but the general theory of the reci-
procity acts s an exemption from taxation by the state adopting it,
19421
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in 1905, the plan was given up until 1925 when four states passed
reciprocity statutes. 26 The impetus behind the movement grew to the
extent that by 1932 over three-fourths of the states had joined the
reciprocity group.27 With the return of multiple taxation, a uniform
state legislative effort will probably solve many of the difficulties
of the reciprocity statutes and cause the "hold-out" states to fall in
line.28
of the intangible property of other states which either (1) do not
levy a succession tax, (2) do not tax the intangible property on
non-resident transferors or decedents, or (3) provide that they
will not tax such property in the case of residents of reciprocal
states. Legis. (1930) 30 COL. T. RV. 806, 808. Indiana is in
the third class. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 6-2427; IND.
ADM. CODE (Horack, 1941) § 6-2427.
26 Pa. Pub. Laws 1925, c. 717; N.Y. Laws, 1925, c. 143; Mass. Acts
1925, c. 338; Conn. Laws 1925, c. 239.
2 7 Kappes, Double Taxation by the States (1940) 18 TAX MAG. 15, 17;
Brady, Death Taxes-Developments in Reciprocity (1929) 15
A. B. A. T. 465, 466.
28 See Brown, Present Status of Multiple Taxation of Intangibles (1942)
40 MICH. L. REV. 806, 829, 830.
